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THE FUTURE OF WORKPLACE 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER FISHER 
REBECCA K. LEE†  
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court’s 2013 decision in Fisher 
v. University of Texas at Austin1 raises interesting questions 
about its relevance for employment discrimination law and what 
employers may be able to do to achieve employee diversity in the 
workplace.  Although Fisher dealt with the constitutionality of an 
affirmative action program used in the university setting to 
promote student body diversity, Fisher’s analysis would further 
apply to race-conscious affirmative action efforts in the public 
sector workplace2 and also offers considerations for private sector 
employers to keep in mind when engaging in similar efforts.3  As 
a relatively recent case that falls under the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence on higher education affirmative action, Fisher 
confirms that the Court’s earlier holdings in Regents of 
University of California v. Bakke,4 Grutter v. Bollinger,5 and 
† Associate Professor of Law, Thomas Jefferson School of Law; B.A., University 
of Chicago; M.P.P., Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government; 
J.D., Georgetown University Law Center. The author would like to thank the 
organizers of the Title VII at 50 Symposium, held at St. John’s University School of 
Law and New York University School of Law, and the participants, including those 
who took part in the roundtable discussion on affirmative action and Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin. 
1 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). This Article addresses 
the Supreme Court’s first ruling in this case and was prepared for publication before 
oral argument and the Court’s decision in Fisher II. See Fisher v. University of 
Texas at Austin, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/fisher-v-
university-of-texas-at-austin-2/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2015, 10:31 AM) [hereinafter 
Fisher, SCOTUSBLOG] (showing that oral argument is scheduled for December 2015 
and noting that the issue presented is “[w]hether the Fifth Circuit’s re-endorsement 
of the University of Texas at Austin’s use of racial preferences in undergraduate 
admissions decisions can be sustained under this Court’s decisions interpreting the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, including Fisher v. 
University of Texas at Austin”). 
2 See infra Part I. 
3 See infra Part II. 
4 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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Gratz v. Bollinger6 serve as good precedent.7  Thus, it remains 
unchanged that a state university has a compelling interest in 
attaining a diverse student body for educational purposes that 
could make it constitutionally permissible under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause to use race as a factor in 
admissions decisions.8  Fisher does not prohibit the use of race in 
affirmative action programs per se by public universities and 
would not prohibit the use of race in affirmative action programs 
by public employers either.  In clarifying the judiciary’s role in 
reviewing governmental decisionmaking involving race, Fisher 
closely examines the narrowly-tailored part of the strict scrutiny 
standard under the Equal Protection Clause and explains that it 
is for the courts to fully and independently assess whether the 
program at issue is narrowly tailored based on the factual 
record.9  In providing this clarification, Fisher provides further 
guidance to public sector employers who engage in affirmative 
action initiatives—guidance that may also be applicable to 
private sector employers on this issue. 
In addition, the Supreme Court in Schuette v. Coalition To 
Defend Affirmative Action,10 which was decided after Fisher and 
also touched upon higher education affirmative action, did not 
change the constitutional permissibility of such initiatives.11  
Schuette instead addressed a different question concerning 
whether a state’s electorate may decide to ban race-conscious 
decisionmaking by governmental actors, including state 
universities.12  Fisher, then, remains intact in upholding the 
5 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
6 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
7 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417 (2013). 
8 See id. at 2419. 
9 Id. at 2419–21. 
10 134 S. Ct 1623 (2014). 
11 Id. at 1630 (“Before the Court addresses the question presented, it is 
important to note what this case is not about. It is not about the constitutionality, or 
the merits, of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education. . . . In Fisher, 
the Court did not disturb the principle that the consideration of race in admissions is 
permissible, provided that certain conditions are met. In this case, as in Fisher, that 
principle is not challenged.”). 
12 Id. (“The question here concerns not the permissibility of race-conscious 
admissions policies under the Constitution but whether, and in what manner, voters 
in the States may choose to prohibit the consideration of racial preferences in 
governmental decisions, in particular with respect to school admissions.”). The state 
constitutional amendment in Schuette adopted by voters in Michigan also prohibits 
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constitutional validity of affirmative action admissions programs 
carried out by state universities so long as they meet certain 
requirements, and the relevance of its constitutional analysis 
would likely extend to affirmative action programs implemented 
by state employers to diversify their workforces.  Although 
private sector workplaces are governed by Title VII,13 and 
accordingly are subject to Title VII’s requirements rather than 
those under the United States Constitution,14 Fisher provides 
lessons to keep in mind for private employers as well when 
making hiring and promotion decisions involving race. 
I. WORKPLACE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION UNDER THE 
CONSTITUTION 
As Fisher recounts, the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
jurisprudence on affirmative action began with Bakke and 
continued with Grutter.15  This body of case law explains that the 
decisions of state entities, such as state universities and public 
sector employers, if based on racial or ethnic origin, must pass 
constitutional muster under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause.16  Specifically, a state program that takes into 
account race must satisfy strict scrutiny, requiring that the 
program advance a compelling governmental interest and is 
narrowly tailored to meet this goal.17  Justice Powell, who wrote 
the controlling opinion in Bakke, stated that a state university 
has a compelling governmental interest in the educational 
benefits that flow from having a diverse student body.18  Grutter, 
which followed Bakke more than two decades later, affirmed that 
attaining student body diversity is a compelling governmental 
interest, as articulated by Justice Powell in Bakke.19  Both Bakke 
and Grutter, like Fisher, concerned a state university’s use of 
preferences in governmental decisions based on sex, color, ethnicity, or national 
origin, in addition to race. Id. at 1629. 
13 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2012) (as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071). This Article focuses on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964. 
14 See infra Part II. 
15 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2417–19 (2013).  
16 Id. at 2419–20. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 2419; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311–12 (1978) 
(Powell, J.) (plurality opinion). 
19 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2422–23 (Scalia, J., concurring); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 328–29 (2003). 
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race in making admissions decisions in order to diversify the 
student body.20  Fisher, in referring to these cases, does not 
reopen them but takes them as good precedent.21  Thus, it 
remains settled that a state university’s interest in bringing 
about racial diversity in its student body by factoring in race in 
admissions would satisfy the compelling interest prong of the 
strict scrutiny standard under the Equal Protection Clause.22  
Although the Fisher Court, in keeping with the Court’s decisions 
in Bakke and Grutter, found the asserted goal of the University of 
Texas at Austin (“UT” or “the University”) of attaining student 
body diversity a compelling state interest, the Court nonetheless 
remanded the case, explaining that the reviewing court must 
separately and fully assess whether the University’s plan was 
narrowly tailored to meet its diversity objective,23 without 
deference to the school’s assertions on this point. 
A. Applying Fisher, Wygant, and Grutter in Implementing 
Affirmative Action Programs in the Public Sector Workplace 
Fisher and the Bakke and Grutter decisions it cites provide 
support to also argue that the benefits of diversity may be 
further recognized as a compelling state interest in the public 
employment context.  Although these cases arose in the higher 
education context, with a focus on the educational benefits of 
having diversity in the student body, the strict scrutiny standard 
applies in any context where race is involved in governmental 
decisionmaking.24  Thus, strict scrutiny would have to be 
satisfied in the public sector workplace context as well if race was 
used. 
In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,25 the Supreme 
Court looked at the constitutionality of a public employer’s layoff 
policy that protected certain minority employees over 
nonminorities from layoffs as part of a collective bargaining 
agreement with the teachers’ union.26  The Wygant Court 
confirmed that strict scrutiny would have to be met because of 
20 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411; Grutter, 539 U.S. 306; Bakke, 438 U.S. 265. 
21 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2417. 
22 Id. at 2419. 
23 Id. at 2421–22. 
24 Id. at 2421.  
25 476 U.S. 267 (1986). 
26 Id. at 269–70. 
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the public employer’s use of race in implementing this policy.27  
Under strict scrutiny, state actors must meet the following  
two-pronged test when using race to make decisions: (1) whether 
a compelling governmental interest supports the use of race and 
(2) whether the method used by the state actor to achieve its 
objective is narrowly tailored to meet the asserted goal.28  This 
test applies whether the state actor is a state university or public 
sector employer. 
The plurality decision in Wygant explained that societal 
discrimination and a role model approach to addressing societal 
discrimination are not enough to warrant the use of race as part 
of the layoff policy but that a need for remedial action could 
justify the consideration of race in an affirmative action program 
if the public employer has sufficient evidence to demonstrate that 
it had engaged in prior discrimination.29  The petitioners in 
Wygant were nonminority employees who were laid off, and they 
sued under the Equal Protection Clause and Title VII, as well as 
under other federal and state statutes.30  The Court stated: 
Evidentiary support for the conclusion that remedial action is 
warranted becomes crucial when the remedial program is 
challenged in court by nonminority employees. . . . In such a 
case, the trial court must make a factual determination that the 
employer had a strong basis in evidence for its conclusion that 
remedial action was necessary.31  
Further, the Court stated that it is the plaintiff-employee’s 
burden to demonstrate that an affirmative action plan is 
unconstitutional.32  In Wygant, the Court did not settle the 
question of whether the Jackson Board of Education (“the 
27 Id. at 273–74. 
28 See id. at 274. 
29 Id. at 274–76; see also Cynthia L. Estlund, Putting Grutter To Work: 
Diversity, Integration, and Affirmative Action in the Workplace, 26 BERKELEY J. 
EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 9 (2005) (“The Wygant plurality seemed to point toward a 
‘remedial only’ theory of affirmative action in employment under the Constitution, 
under which public employers were entitled to remedy only the underrepresentation 
to which they—the particular agency, that is—had at least arguably contributed. 
The ‘remedial only’ theory of affirmative action under the Constitution, and the 
focus on particularized evidence of past discrimination, gained credence with the 
Court’s decisions striking down minority business set-asides in public contracting in 
Croson and Adarand.” (footnote omitted)). 
30 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 272. 
31 Id. at 277. 
32 Id. at 277–78. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 107 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 107 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_LEE.DOC 3/23/16  11:17 PM 
602 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:597   
Board”) had the required strong basis in evidence to support its 
conclusion that remedial action was needed because it 
determined, in any event, that the layoff policy did not satisfy the 
narrowly tailored prong.33  The Court is particularly concerned 
when an employer’s affirmative action policy involves a  
race-conscious preferential system for layoffs—as opposed to  
hiring—because layoffs exact a particular kind of injury on 
innocent individuals that is more directly and deeply disruptive 
to an employee’s seniority-based rights and expectations on the 
job.34  Preferential hiring objectives, on the one hand, impose a 
burden broadly on innocent individuals, whereas preferential 
layoffs, on the other hand, impose a specific and concentrated 
burden on only a small number of individuals.35  Thus, even if the 
Board’s asserted goal could be justified as a permissible 
governmental purpose, the Board’s layoff scheme was not 
narrowly tailored to satisfy the requirements under the 
Constitution.36 
As Wygant illustrates, addressing societal discrimination 
would not constitute a compelling governmental interest that 
would justify a race-conscious affirmative action plan, and a 
layoff policy based on race also would not satisfy the Equal 
Protection Clause’s narrow tailoring mandate.37  But when it 
comes to race-conscious hiring and diversity-related goals, 
Grutter and Fisher help show that employers, including public 
employers, may pursue an interest in the business and 
organizational benefits that flow from having a diverse 
workforce.38  Consider the amicus briefs relied on by the Court in 
33 Id. at 278. 
34 Id. at 282–83. 
35 Id. at 283. 
36 Id. at 283–84. 
37 Id. at 274, 276, 283. 
38 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013); Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 347 (2003). See generally Rebecca K. Lee, Implementing 
Grutter’s Diversity Rationale: Diversity and Empathy in Leadership, 19 DUKE J. 
GENDER L. & POL’Y 133, 141 (2011) [hereinafter Lee, Implementing Grutter’s 
Diversity Rationale], cited and quoted in Brief for the State of California as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-345), 2012 WL 
3540401, at *9–10; Brief of Distinguished Alumni of the University of Texas at 
Austin as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411 (No. 11-
345), 2012 WL 3418594, at *10; Rebecca K. Lee, Fisher v. University of Texas at 
Austin: Promoting Full Judicial Review and Process in Applying Strict Scrutiny, 4 
HOUS. L. REV. OFF REC. 33, 39–40 (2013) [hereinafter Lee, Promoting Full Judicial 
Review and Process]. See, e.g., Consolidated Brief of Lt. Gen. Julius W. Becton, Jr. et 
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Grutter—arguments put forth by various employers and 
corporations in support of Justice Powell’s diversity rationale 
emphasizing that our heterogeneous and international economy 
needs leaders in the workplace with “exposure to widely diverse 
people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints.”39  The amici in Grutter, 
made up of public and private sector employers, recognized that 
the benefits from exposure to diverse individuals extend beyond 
school and into the workforce.40  Diversity in the workplace is 
needed for organizations and businesses to operate competitively 
and effectively and to create a work setting that is “inclusive, 
comfortable, and reflective of the multicultural communities in 
which [businesses do] business.”41  Because many employers seek 
to hire graduates from top schools, employers have a strong 
interest in taking note of the population of students who get 
admitted into our nation’s selective colleges and  
universities—students who then make up the pool of college 
graduates from which employers recruit their employees.42  To 
draw upon the full range of talent available and to be competitive 
in our diverse society and economy, employers commonly look to 
recruit diverse, qualified college graduates with wide-ranging 
experiences and knowledge.43 
As part of its judicial review, it is proper for a court to give 
some deference to a university’s expertise and judgment that 
diversity is indispensable to its pedagogical mission.44  The 
al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 
02-516), 2003 WL 1787554, at *1, *5; Brief for Amici Curiae 65 Leading American 
Businesses in Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 
2003 WL 399056, at *2, *5–6. 
39 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330; see, e.g., Brief of Exxon Mobil Corp. as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 
2003 WL 554411, at *4; Brief for 65 Leading American Businesses, supra note 38, at 
*2; Brief of General Motors Corp. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondents, 
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 399096, at *12; Brief of Amici 
Curiae Massachusetts Institute of Technology, et al. in Support of Respondents, 
Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 (Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 367215, at *9. 
40 See, e.g., Brief of Exxon Mobil Corp., supra note 39, at *4; Brief of General 
Motors Corp., supra note 38, at *6; see also Estlund, supra note 29, at 19–20. 
41 Brief of Exxon Mobil Corp., supra note 39, at *1, *3–4. 
42 See Brief of the Leadership Conference on Civil Rights and the LCCR 
Education Fund as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents, Grutter, 539 U.S. 306 
(Nos. 02-241, 02-516), 2003 WL 536770, at *20; Lee, Implementing Grutter’s 
Diversity Rationale, supra note 38, at 141–42. 
43 See, e.g., Brief of Exxon Mobil Corp., supra note 39, at *3–4. 
44 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419 (2013); Grutter, 
539 U.S. at 328–29. 
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Supreme Court recognizes that a university is engaged in the 
learning enterprise and thus seeks a diverse student body to 
foster a better learning environment.45  In looking at the 
workplace context, however, there is admittedly a difference 
between the mission of a university and that of an employer;46 
accordingly, employers cannot claim to have the same kind of 
educational mission.47  But employers have asserted that a 
diverse workforce is needed to better inform a given employer’s 
service or product and to better take into account the realities of 
the diverse marketplace.48  Moreover, both employers and 
universities seek to cultivate and produce leaders.49  
Consequently, employers as well as universities can have 
diversity-related missions, and thus public employers may be 
able to make an analogous argument that they have a compelling 
interest in the benefits that come with having a diverse 
workforce.  Relying on Fisher and Grutter for support, public 
employers may be able to successfully meet the compelling 
interest prong of the strict scrutiny standard with respect to a 
race-conscious hiring or promotion process.50  And based on their 
particular experiences and organizational judgment, employers 
are in the best position to know whether diversity is essential for 
their respective institutional missions.  Just as a university’s 
experience and expert judgment that diversity is crucial for its 
educational mission receives some judicial deference, an  
 
45 See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328–30. 
46 See Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2419; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 329. 
47 See Estlund, supra note 29, at 21. 
48 See, e.g., Brief of General Motors Corp., supra note 39, at *6 (“Immersion in a 
multiracial academic environment enhances students’ knowledge of different 
cultures and their understanding of perspectives that are influenced by race. That 
augmented understanding in turn prepares students, upon graduation, to work 
cooperatively in multiracial environments and to serve multiracial clienteles.”); Brief 
of Exxon Mobil Corp., supra note 39, at *8–9 (“A diverse workforce not only 
generates varied perspectives, which improve decision-making, increase 
productivity, and help companies understand the different environments in which 
business is conducted today, but also contributes to a positive work environment and 
decreasing incidents of discrimination.”). 
49 Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312–13 (1978); see also 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–32. 
50 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 283 n.11 (1986) (stating 
that the earlier “ ‘school admission’ cases . . . involve the same basic concepts as 
cases involving hiring goals”). Although these cases predate Grutter and Fisher, they 
still involve decision-making that took into account race by a state university. See id. 
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employer’s professional and organizational judgment that 
diversity is essential for its institutional mission should be given 
some judicial deference.51 
If it can be established that the goal of attaining workforce 
diversity is a compelling state interest, then the reviewing court 
would need to independently determine whether the employer’s 
selection process is narrowly tailored to meet this asserted goal, 
as explained in Fisher respecting the narrowly-tailored 
requirement under strict scrutiny.52  That is, a court would need 
to examine whether an employer’s hiring process is 
individualized and flexible so that it considers the applicant’s 
race or ethnicity as one of many relevant factors and not as the 
determinative factor.53  A court must also determine whether the 
employer could have feasibly implemented an alternative hiring 
process without the use of race;54 this does not mean, however, 
that an employer would have had to fully explore every possible 
alternative that would have avoided the use of race, but instead 
that an employer should have fully considered all feasible  
race-neutral options.55  It seems a court could also appropriately 
note an employer’s experience and knowledge in deciding to use 
or not use particular hiring approaches, but the court in its 
examination must rely on the evidence presented by the 
employer on this question without simply deferring to an 
employer’s good-faith assertion that it looked at all race-neutral 
options.56 
If deference were given to a public sector employer as to 
whether it has a compelling interest in having workforce 
diversity, which is the first part of the strict scrutiny standard, 
then it arguably makes sense to require the employer to present 
sufficient evidence to meet the second part of the strict scrutiny 
standard in demonstrating its need for a hiring process that 
51 See Estlund, supra note 29, at 33 (“Courts that follow the logic of Grutter into 
the public sector workplace might accord deference toward employers’ institutional 
justifications for preferences that in fact tend to diversify and integrate 
predominantly white workplaces. Such deference would be grounded not in any 
special constitutional privilege of employers to define their own mission or needs, 
but in the ordinary deference that government employers are accorded in 
determining what their institutional mission and needs require.”). 
52 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2419–20 (2013). 
53 Id. at 2420. 
54 See id. 
55 See id. (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003)). 
56 See id. at 2420–21. 
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considers race.  Judicial review would lose its specific purpose if 
the employer were to receive deference on both parts of the strict 
scrutiny test.57  For the court to fully carry out its judicial review 
under strict scrutiny, the court should undertake a separate and 
independent review to ensure that any selection process by the 
employer involving the use of race is not too broad for the 
purpose of meeting the asserted goal.  Solely or overly relying on 
the governmental actor’s arguments in meeting the narrow 
tailoring requirement would give the governmental party the 
discretion to both implement its chosen selection process and 
confirm its proper use.  If judicial deference is given in one part 
of the strict scrutiny analysis, then the court ought to play a 
more active role in reviewing the other part in order for there to 
be a proper review of the state actor’s decisions.58 
However, this does not, and should not, mean that a court 
should ignore the employer’s experience and particular 
familiarity with the use of certain selection processes in its 
industry; a court can and should take note of this.  But having 
the court carefully perform its evidence-based review recognizes 
the court’s important role in terms of judicial process, 
particularly under strict scrutiny where race is concerned.  As a 
matter of procedural consistency when assessing the 
constitutionality of governmental action, a court should conduct 
an independent judicial review even when the state program 
appears to have been thoroughly considered and pursued in good 
faith.59  But judicial review should make it possible for a public 
employer to be able to meet its diversity-related workplace goals 
so long as it can present sufficient evidence to demonstrate to the 
court that its hiring or selection process is narrowly tailored to 
achieve the workplace and business benefits of diversity. 
The evidentiary requirement should be a realistic and not 
impossible standard to meet, keeping in mind that state 
employers, in meeting this burden, may likely have to expend 
greater administrative costs and effort to collect and maintain 
the information.  At the same time, public employers may, in any 
event, already keep track of this information and certainly 
57 See Lee, Promoting Full Judicial Review and Process, supra note 38, at 35, 37 
(making a similar point regarding judicial review of a university’s race-conscious 
admissions program under strict scrutiny). 
58 See id. at 35. 
59 See id. at 37. 
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should do so to make sure that their hiring or selection processes 
are specifically tailored to meet their asserted objectives.  Fisher 
just requires that this evidence be presented for the reviewing 
court to examine.60   
B. Fisher on Remand 
Because Fisher was decided in the lower courts on summary 
judgment before reaching the Supreme Court, the record was 
developed as part of the summary judgment proceedings and not 
as part of any trial.61  The Supreme Court did not rule on 
whether the current summary judgment record was sufficient to 
demonstrate the constitutionality of the admissions policy at 
issue; instead, it remanded the case after further explaining the 
court’s role in conducting a proper judicial review under strict 
scrutiny and clarifying the evidentiary requirements needed for 
such a review.62  On the evidentiary question back in the Fifth 
Circuit on remand, the University stated that the record from its 
summary judgment motion should be sufficient to meet the 
constitutional standard set forth by the Supreme Court.  
Nonetheless, the University requested that the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit send the case back down so 
that the district court could rehear the case first and allow for 
further factual presentation.63  After more briefing and oral 
argument, the Fifth Circuit denied the University’s motion for 
remand on the procedural issue, explaining that although it had 
the discretion to remand the case to the district court, doing so 
was not necessary for the court to complete its review and would 
yield no concrete benefit.64  Circuit Judge Patrick Higginbotham, 
writing the majority opinion, which was joined by Circuit Judge 
Carolyn King, stated that the existing record was sufficient since 
there were no new factual issues in need of resolution and 
60 Fisher, 133 S. Ct. at 2421. 
61 Id. at 2417, 2421. 
62 See generally id. 
63 Appellees’ Statement Concerning Further Proceedings on Remand at 1–2,  
Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin (Fisher on remand), 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014) 
(No. 09-50822), available at http://lgdata.s3-website-us-east-1.amazonaws.com/docs/ 
971/812884/Appellees__Statement_Concerning_Further_Proceedings_on_Remand.pd
f; Supplemental Brief for Appellees at 5–6, Fisher on remand, 758 F.3d 633 (No. 09-
50822), available at https://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/2013-10-25-UT-Fis 
her.Supp.Br.pdf. 
64 Fisher on remand, 758 F.3d at 640–42. 
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because the reviewing court’s error that the Supreme Court 
noted was made by both the appellate court and the district court 
in the same way.65 
Turning to the merits of the case, the majority stated that 
under the proper strict scrutiny standard, it had a duty to 
independently evaluate, based on the evidence, whether the 
school’s method of attaining student body diversity was narrowly 
tailored to meet its asserted diversity goal.66  To satisfy the 
narrow tailoring requirement, the reviewing court must find that 
it is necessary for a university to use race for it to achieve the 
pedagogical benefits that flow from student diversity and that no 
workable race-neutral alternatives would bring about these 
benefits.67  In conducting its assessment, the court cannot defer 
to the school on whether the means selected to achieve the 
school’s stated purpose is narrowly tailored to achieve that 
purpose, but the court can take note of the university’s 
experience and expert knowledge in independently evaluating 
the school’s admission process.68 
The Fifth Circuit perused the record concerning UT’s use of 
its Top Ten Percent Plan (“Percent Plan”), which gave Texas 
students who graduate in the top ten percent of their high school 
class automatic admission to any public university in Texas.69  
This race-neutral method was used to select over eighty percent 
of its Texas students.70  The University also used, in conjunction 
with this admissions program, an individualized, race-conscious 
holistic review to select the small remaining percentage of the 
entering class.71  The court noted that UT additionally engaged in 
a variety of race-neutral outreach and scholarship programs to 
facilitate interaction with underrepresented student 
populations.72  In its independent assessment, the Fifth Circuit 
found that the school used a range of race-neutral  
 
 
 
65 Id. at 641–42. 
66 Id. at 643–44. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. at 645. 
70 Id. at 645–46. 
71 Id. at 645. 
72 Id. at 647–48. 
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methods to try to grow minority enrollment and admitted the 
vast majority of its students through the race-neutral Percent 
Plan.73 
Moreover, the court found that the University’s use of a 
holistic review process, which considered the race of the 
applicants as one factor among many, served to complement the 
pool of students admitted through the Percent Plan.74  The  
race-neutral Percent Plan, by looking at only one measure of 
achievement, failed to bring in students with diverse 
accomplishments, experiences, and backgrounds that would 
enrich the class profile but who did not make the rigid ten 
percent cut-off.75  The holistic review thus supplemented and 
complemented the Percent Plan by looking at a spectrum of 
characteristics and contributions that applicants had to  
offer.76  Further, the holistic review was implemented as a highly 
individualized and highly competitive review process, given the 
small percentage of seats filled outside the Percent Plan, and did 
not operate as a quota system or as an unlimited program in 
terms of time.77  In painstakingly examining all of these aspects 
of UT’s admissions program, the court held that the school’s 
means for achieving its goal of student body diversity was 
narrowly tailored and thus strict scrutiny was satisfied.78  As a 
result, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the University.79 
 
 
73 Id. at 649. 
74 Id. at 653. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. at 647, 654. 
78 Id. at 637, 659. 
79 Id. at 637, 660. In July 2014, Plaintiff Abigail Fisher submitted a petition for 
rehearing en banc in the Fifth Circuit, and the court of appeals denied the petition. 
Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1, Fisher on remand, 758 F.3d 633 (No. 09-50822), 
available at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/7.29.14.Fisher.Petition.for.Re 
hearing.En.Banc.pdf; Order Denying Rehearing En Banc, Fisher on remand, 758 
F.3d (No. 09-50822), available at http://www.utexas.edu/vp/irla/Documents/ 
11.12.2014.Rehearing.En.Banc.DENIED.pdf. In February 2015, the plaintiff filed a 
writ of certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, and on June 29, 2015, the Supreme 
Court agreed to hear the case during its 2015–16 term. Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, No. 14-981 (U.S. argued Dec. 9, 2015), 
2015 WL 603513; Fisher, SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 1. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 111 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 111 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_LEE.DOC 3/23/16  11:17 PM 
610 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:597   
Circuit Judge Emilio Garza wrote a dissenting opinion, in 
which he questioned what the University meant when it used the 
term “critical mass” of student diversity.80  In his view, the school 
framed its diversity goal as achieving a critical mass but was 
unable to objectively define this term in order to enable the court 
to do its separate assessment.81  Because Judge Garza found that 
the school was unable to satisfactorily define critical mass and 
what it requires, he did not think the court could make an 
independent determination as to whether the school’s  
race-conscious means of achieving this critical mass were 
narrowly tailored.82  The majority, however, did not find fault 
with the University’s use of this term because it understood that 
critical mass could not be defined simply as a numerical  
goal.83 The majority demonstrated a fuller and more 
contextualized understanding of critical mass in trying to achieve 
student body diversity, stating: 
Critical mass, the tipping point of diversity, has no fixed upper 
bound of universal application, nor is it the minimum threshold 
at which minority students do not feel isolated or like 
spokespersons for their race.  Grutter defines critical mass by 
reference to a broader view of diversity rather than by the 
achievement of a certain quota of minority students.  Here, UT 
Austin has demonstrated a permissible goal of achieving the 
educational benefits of diversity within that university’s distinct 
mission, not seeking a percentage of minority students that 
reaches some arbitrary size.84 
C. Electoral Review Under Schuette 
In Schuette, the Supreme Court’s most recent decision on 
affirmative action, the Court did not disturb the strict scrutiny 
analysis for race-conscious decisionmaking.  Rather, the Court 
addressed a different issue concerning the electoral process and 
state affirmative action programs.  Schuette allows for 
limitations on the ability of state actors to use affirmative action 
if the restrictions are made part of a state’s constitution through 
80 Fisher on remand, 758 F.3d at 661–62 (Garza, J., dissenting). 
81 Id. at 661, 666. 
82 Id. at 666. 
83 Id. at 654 (majority opinion). 
84 Id. at 656. 
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voter enactment or amendment.85  Schuette thus presented 
questions concerning the legislative process at the state level on 
whether state actors can consider race in making decisions. 
But this case, in allowing a state’s voters to weigh in on 
whether a state actor can consider race in making decisions, even 
for constitutionally valid programs such as the University of 
Michigan’s revised college admissions process,86 arguably permits 
another type of review—what can be called an “electoral 
review”—of a public actor’s affirmative action program, in 
addition to the already required judicial review of such programs.  
This electoral review exists as another layer of review by making 
it possible for a state’s electorate to review, and approve or reject, 
a governmental actor’s race-conscious decisionmaking.87  If voters 
are permitted to approve or reject an affirmative action plan 
after public debate via electoral review, as seen in  
Schuette,88 then state actors should be further prepared to 
provide information to the public at large concerning their  
race-conscious affirmative action programs in the event that the 
use of race in state decisions is brought up for a public vote.  
Thus, sufficient evidence to show why and how race is being 
considered is relevant and central for independent judicial review 
and any potential electoral review. 
II. AFFIRMATIVE ACTION UNDER TITLE VII 
As for either a private-sector or public-sector employer’s use 
of race as part of a voluntary affirmative action plan under Title 
VII, the statutory language of Title VII does not prohibit 
voluntary affirmative action efforts.89  On the contrary, the 
Supreme Court has ruled that the statute allows voluntary 
affirmative action to address racial or gender imbalances.90  In 
enacting Title VII, Congress sought to avoid unnecessary federal 
85 Schuette v. Coal. To Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1635, 1638 
(2014). 
86 Id. at 1638. 
87 See id. at 1629 (“After a statewide debate on the question of racial preferences 
in the context of governmental decisionmaking, the voters, in 2006, adopted an 
amendment to the State Constitution prohibiting state and other governmental 
entities in Michigan from granting certain preferences, including race-based 
preferences, in a wide range of actions and decisions.”). 
88 See id. 
89 United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 203–04 (1979). 
90 See id. at 204–06; Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641–42 (1987). 
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regulation of private businesses.91  Further, Title VII was enacted 
under Congress’s commerce power to govern private-sector actors 
and was not meant to incorporate the requirements of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.92  Title VII thus has been interpreted to 
allow for an employer’s exercise of business judgment in meeting 
the statute’s antidiscrimination goals.  If an employer’s business 
judgment is that diversity is essential to its institutional mission, 
then this should receive some judicial deference under Title VII.  
Although business necessity cannot be used as a defense to a 
charge of intentional discrimination,93 using business necessity 
would be permissible in setting forth a valid affirmative action 
plan because asserting the existence of a lawful affirmative 
action plan is not an affirmative defense but simply does not 
amount to action that violates Title VII.94 
A. Applying Weber and Johnson in Implementing Workplace 
Affirmative Action 
The Supreme Court first addressed affirmative action under 
Title VII in United Steelworkers of America v. Weber95 and 
Johnson v. Santa Clara Transportation Agency;96 these cases 
remain the relevant precedent for private and public employers 
under Title VII.  In Weber, the private employer implemented a 
voluntary affirmative action plan, which was negotiated with the 
91 Weber, 443 U.S. at 206–07. 
92 Id. at 206 n.6. 
93 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(2) (2012); Estlund, supra note 
29, at 35. 
94 See Johnson, 480 U.S. at 626–27 (“As a preliminary matter, we note that 
petitioner bears the burden of establishing the invalidity of the Agency’s Plan. Only 
last Term, in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education, we held that ‘[t]he ultimate  
burden remains with the employees to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an 
affirmative-action program,’ and we see no basis for a different rule regarding a 
plan’s alleged violation of Title VII. This case also fits readily within the analytical 
framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green. Once a plaintiff 
establishes a prima facie case that race or sex has been taken into account in an 
employer’s employment decision, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a 
nondiscriminatory rationale for its decision. The existence of an affirmative action 
plan provides such a rationale. If such a plan is articulated as the basis for the 
employer’s decision, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the employer’s 
justification is pretextual and the plan is invalid. . . . [R]eliance on an affirmative 
action plan is to be treated as an affirmative defense requiring the employer to carry 
the burden of proving the validity of the plan. The burden of proving its invalidity 
remains on the plaintiff.” (citation omitted)). 
95 443 U.S. 193. 
96 Johnson, 480 U.S. at 619. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 113 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 113 Side A      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_LEE.DOC 3/23/16  11:17 PM 
2015] FUTURE OF WORKPLACE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 613 
union, that reserved for black employees fifty percent of open 
positions in newly-created training programs until the 
percentage of skilled black craftworkers approached the 
percentage of blacks in the local labor force.97  Before this plan 
was implemented, craftworker jobs were filled with employees 
who had craft experience, commonly gained through an 
apprentice system that historically had excluded blacks.98  Brian 
Weber, an unskilled white worker, sued under Title VII because 
black workers with less seniority than he had were accepted into 
the craft training program.99  The Supreme Court upheld the 
employer’s voluntary, race-conscious affirmative action plan 
under Title VII.100 
As the Court explained, this affirmative action plan was 
permissible because “the plan [did] not unnecessarily trammel 
the interests of the white employees [and did] not require the 
discharge of white workers and their replacement with new black 
hirees.  Nor [did] the plan create an absolute bar to the 
advancement of white employees.”101  “Moreover, the plan [was] a 
temporary measure.”102  An employer’s use of a voluntary,  
race-conscious affirmative action plan, if it meets these 
requirements, is not discrimination under Title VII.103 
Johnson built on Weber’s analysis regarding the validity of 
an employer’s voluntary affirmative action plan under Title VII 
and involved a gender-conscious plan.104  In Johnson, a county 
employer unilaterally implemented an Affirmative Action Plan 
(“Plan”) that applied to employee promotions.105  The employer 
was allowed to take gender into account as a factor when making 
promotion decisions within a traditionally segregated job 
category where women were greatly underrepresented.106  In its 
Plan, the employer noted that women were underrepresented in 
the agency as a whole and in particular in five of seven job 
categories, and that the agency’s female workers were clustered 
97 Weber, 443 U.S. at 197–99. 
98 Id. at 198. 
99 Id. at 199–200. 
100 Id. at 200. 
101 Id. at 208 (citation omitted). 
102 Id. 
103 See id. at 208–09. 
104 Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 616–17 (1987). 
105 Id. at 619. 
106 Id. at 620–21. 
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largely in clerical and office positions which were traditionally 
occupied by women.107  The county employer’s long-term objective 
was to attain a workforce whose composition mirrored the 
proportion of minorities and women in the surrounding area’s 
labor force.108  The Plan advised creating short-term goals that 
would be updated yearly and used as a practical guide in making 
employment decisions at the agency.109 
The plaintiff, Paul Johnson, was a male employee who 
applied for a promotion to become a road dispatcher.110  Diane 
Joyce, a female employee who also applied for this position, was 
promoted pursuant to the agency’s Plan.111  For this road 
dispatcher position, Johnson and Joyce, along with seven other 
applicants, were found to be qualified for the job, and they each 
were given an interview with a two-person board.112  Seven of the 
applicants, again including Johnson and Joyce, “were certified as 
eligible for selection by the appointing authority.”113  Three 
agency supervisors completed a second interview round, and they 
recommended that Johnson be promoted.114  Before this second 
interview, Joyce had contacted the county’s Affirmative Action 
Office due to a concern that her application would not receive 
serious consideration.115  Consequently, the Affirmative Action 
Office reached out to the agency’s Affirmative Action Coordinator 
who recommended to the agency’s director that Joyce be 
promoted.116  There were no skilled female craftworkers in the 
agency at the time, and a woman had never been employed as a 
road dispatcher at the agency.117  The director ultimately decided 
to promote Joyce to road dispatcher.118 
The Court found the agency’s Plan to be permissible under 
Title VII, relying on Weber as the guiding precedent.119  The 
Court first considered whether there was a manifest imbalance 
107 Id. at 621. 
108 Id. at 621–22. 
109 Id. at 622. 
110 Id. at 619. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 623. 
113 Id. at 623–24. 
114 Id. at 624. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 624–25. 
119 See id. at 627–28, 630–39, 642. 
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in skilled craft positions, leading to the underrepresentation of 
women in a traditionally segregated job category that would 
justify using gender as a factor in assessing applicants for these 
jobs.120  According to the Court, gender was properly taken into 
account in order to correct the underrepresentation of women in 
skilled craft jobs.121  Next, the Court examined whether the Plan 
“unnecessarily trammeled the rights of male employees or 
created an absolute bar to their advancement.”122  Because the 
Plan did not set aside positions exclusively for women and 
instead authorized the consideration of gender as one of many 
factors when evaluating applicants, the Plan required that all 
qualified female applicants be evaluated against all other 
qualified applicants for these skilled craft jobs.123  The Court 
further noted that Johnson, the male petitioner, was not entitled 
in an absolute sense to the promotion he sought since he was one 
of seven applicants who were deemed qualified and eligible for 
the position.124  Also, Johnson continued to have his job with the 
county employer and was eligible to apply for other advancement 
opportunities.125 
For an affirmative action plan to be permissible under Title 
VII, the plan also must be temporary—that is, the plan must be 
intended to eliminate manifest racial or gender imbalance, but 
not to maintain a racial or gender balance.126  The Plan at issue 
satisfied this requirement by taking realistic, incremental steps 
to eliminate gender underrepresentation and stating a goal of 
attaining a balanced workforce.127 
The Court in Johnson also clarified that under either Title 
VII or the Constitution, the petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing that the employer’s affirmative action plan is 
invalid.128  If the plaintiff can prove this, then the plan would 
amount to a formal policy of discrimination and, as such, would 
violate Title VII as well as the Equal Protection Clause.129  But, 
120 Id. at 631–32. 
121 Id. at 634, 636–37. 
122 Id. at 637–38. 
123 Id. at 638. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 639–40. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 626. 
129 Id. 
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 114 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 114 Side B      04/08/2016   13:04:55
C M
Y K
FINAL_LEE.DOC 3/23/16  11:17 PM 
616 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 89:597   
as seen through the constitutional cases and Title VII cases on 
the validity of employer plans, Title VII takes a more flexible 
approach to affirmative action than does the Constitution. 
B. Lessons from Ricci, Fisher, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act 
In Ricci v. DeStefano,130 a 2009 Supreme Court case, the 
Court took a notable turn in importing a constitutional test into 
its analysis under Title VII, although the case did not deal with 
affirmative action but with disparate-treatment and  
disparate-impact discrimination.131  Specifically, Ricci involved 
the discarding of test results normally used to make promotion 
decisions in the city’s firefighting department by a city employer 
because of a statistical racial disparity in the results after the 
test was given.132  Ricci held that the city’s action in discarding 
the test results was race-based and that under Title VII such 
race-based action is prohibited unless the city could show a 
strong basis in evidence that had it not taken this action it would 
have been liable for disparate-impact discrimination.133 
Although this strong-basis-in-evidence test had previously 
only been used in the constitutional context to assess claims of 
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause, the Supreme 
Court explained that it should be further employed in the Title 
VII context because this standard would ensure that the statute’s 
disparate-treatment and disparate-impact provisions are both 
enforced.134  This standard would permit an infringement on one 
provision in order to uphold the other only in certain limited 
situations.135  According to the Court: 
The standard leaves ample room for employers’ voluntary 
compliance efforts, which are essential to the statutory scheme 
and to Congress’s efforts to eradicate workplace discrimination.  
And the standard appropriately constrains employers’ discretion 
in making race-based decisions: It limits that discretion to cases 
in which there is a strong basis in evidence of disparate-impact 
liability, but it is not so restrictive that it allows employers to 
act only when there is a provable, actual violation.136 
130 557 U.S. 557 (2009). 
131 Id. at 562. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 583–85. 
134 Id. at 583. 
135 Id. 
136 Id. 
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By extending the applicability of this constitutional standard 
to Title VII, the Ricci Court moved toward some convergence 
between the constitutional and statutory approaches, at least 
when evaluating the statute’s disparate-treatment and 
disparate-impact provisions and created a higher evidentiary 
burden under Title VII.  But Ricci was not an affirmative action 
case, and Johnson, which dealt with affirmative action under 
Title VII, clearly held that Title VII should not be interpreted to 
incorporate the commands of the Constitution.137  Ricci and 
Fisher indicate, however, that the Supreme Court is looking for 
strong evidentiary support when it reviews decisions involving 
race, whether under Title VII or the Constitution. 
Further, Title VII was amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act 
(“the 1991 Act”),138 which added section 116139 as an amendment 
to Title VII, and is the only part of the statute that expressly 
refers to affirmative action,140 stating, “Nothing in the 
amendments made by this title shall be construed to affect  
court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation 
agreements, that are in accordance with the law.”141  This 
statement can be interpreted to mean that the 1991 Act, in 
amending Title VII, does not affect affirmative action that is in 
accordance with Title VII or any other law.  In enacting the 1991 
amendments to Title VII, Congress expressly rejected the 
Supreme Court’s decision in an earlier Title VII case but did not 
take any action to modify or reject the Supreme Court’s rulings 
in Weber and Johnson.142  In fact, section 116 appears to preserve 
137 Id. at 563; Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 627 n.6 (1987). But see 
generally Sachin S. Pandya, Detecting the Stealth Erosion of Precedent: Affirmative 
Action After Ricci, 31 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 285 (2010) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court in Ricci wrote the decision in a way designed to intentionally erode 
Weber and Johnson in order to advance an interpretation of Title VII that would 
allow affirmative action plans only in situations where the employer sought to 
remedy its own actual or arguable prior discrimination). 
138 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). 
139 Id. § 116, 105 Stat. at 1079; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
140 Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 116, 105 Stat. at 1079. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. §§ 2–3, 105 Stat. at 1071. (“The Congress finds that . . . the decision of the 
Supreme Court in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) has 
weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections [and] 
legislation is necessary to provide additional protections against unlawful 
discrimination in employment. . . . The purposes of this Act are . . . to codify the 
concepts of ‘business necessity’ and ‘job related’ enunciated by the Supreme Court in 
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the legal force of those cases by stating that nothing in the 1991 
Act affects affirmative action plans that are in accordance with 
these cases, and section 116 makes no changes to the Court’s 
holdings.143  Thus, Weber and Johnson continue to serve as the 
applicable precedent for affirmative action cases under Title VII. 
But to the extent that the Supreme Court’s approach to 
affirmative action under Title VII becomes stricter after Ricci 
and Fisher, and potentially more aligned with the constitutional 
test, public and private employers who wish to implement  
race-conscious or gender-conscious affirmative action plans for 
hiring and promotion decisions would be well advised to model 
their selection processes based on those in not just Weber and 
Johnson, but also the processes used in Grutter and Fisher.  
Private sector employers who implement affirmative action 
policies should be prepared to satisfy the standards set out in 
Weber and Johnson as well as prepared to potentially have to 
satisfy something closer to the strict scrutiny standard under 
Grutter and Fisher. In other words, a reviewing court may need 
to independently assess the validity of the program in the event 
that the Supreme Court also moves toward a more rigorous 
evidentiary assessment of affirmative action programs by private 
sector employers. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision on race-conscious affirmative 
action in Fisher, along with the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in Fisher on 
remand, importantly preserves the validity of affirmative action 
programs in state decisionmaking if the programs meet certain 
criteria under strict scrutiny and satisfy full judicial review.  
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court 
decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).”). 
143 In fact, in Johnson the Supreme Court noted the lack of congressional 
reaction to Weber: 
As Justice Blackmun said in his concurrence in Weber, “[I]f the Court has 
misperceived the political will, it has the assurance that because the 
question is statutory Congress may set a different course if it so chooses.” 
Congress has not amended [Title VII] to reject our construction [in Weber], 
nor have any such amendments even been proposed, and we therefore may 
assume that our interpretation was correct. 
Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 629 n.7 (1987) (first alteration in original) 
(citation omitted); see also Michael J. Zimmer, Taxman: Affirmative Action Dodges 
Five Bullets, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 229, 233–35 (1998). 
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Although Fisher arose in the higher education context,144 its 
application extends to the public setting more generally and thus 
would also apply to the public sector workplace under the 
Constitution, making it permissible for public sector employers to 
use race-conscious affirmative action in hiring and promoting 
employees.  The approach taken in Fisher also provides relevant 
considerations for private sector employers who pursue 
affirmative action under Title VII, even if indirectly.  Private 
sector employers can still look to Weber and Johnson in 
proceeding with affirmative action programs that consider race 
or gender; moreover, to further bolster their use of race in the 
wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Fisher and Grutter, 
they would be wise to also take note of the Court’s recent views 
concerning the evidentiary requirements needed to uphold such 
programs in the public sector. 
 
144 Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2415 (2013). 
